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Book Review

LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. By
Paul W. Kahn., New Haven & London: Yale University
Press. 1992. Pp. xi, 260. $27.50.
Daniel 0. Conkle2
For those who grimace at the thought of another book about
constitutional theory, think again. In Legitimacy and History,
Professor Paul W. Kahn offers a fascinating and richly nuanced
intellectual history and critique of American constitutional theory. This is an outstanding book. It contains original and important insights not only about historical developments, but also
about the predicament of contemporary constitutional thought.
The task of constitutional theory is to reconcile the concept
of self-government with the existence of constitutional limitations on the exercise of political power. To accomplish this task,
according to Kahn, a theory of constitutional government must
address the passage of time since the adoption of the Constitution. Thus, in the hands of Kahn, what Alexander Bickel called
the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"3 becomes "the problem of
temporality." Why should the self-governing present be bound
by the constitutional enactments of the past? To answer this
question, Kahn writes, one must appeal to the political self-identification of citizens. More precisely, one must link citizens to the
Constitution in such a way that they regard the Constitution,
however dated its enactment, as somehow a product of their own
self-government. Relatedly, one must address the relative roles
of "reason" (political "science" or truth) and "will" (democratic
1.

Professor of Law, Yale Law School.

2. Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow, Indiana University at
Bloomington.
3. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 16-23 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).

247

248

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:247

consent or legitimacy) in one's understanding of constitutional
government.
The problem of temporality varies in complexion during different historical periods, and so gives rise to different theoretical
responses. Kahn divides the history of American constitutional
theory into four major periods, each of them dominated by a particular conceptual model. A model of "making" dominated the
founding period, but by the middle of the nineteenth century,
this model had been replaced by one of "organic maintenance."
Thereafter, there arose a model of constitutional "growth" or
"evolution," which served to justify both the Lochner era 4 and,
ironically, Lochner's demise. Finally, in the contemporary period, Kahn claims that the model of growth has given way to a
model of "community," which attempts to ground constitutional
government in a community of discourse.
Not surprisingly, temporality was not a problem under the
"making" model of the founding period. During this period, the
Constitution was regarded as an object to be formed by the people, acting as political artisans schooled in the science of politics.
The self-governing acts by which the Constitution was created
thus served to synthesize the reason of political science with the
will of democratic consent. At least in theory, this synthesis
of reason and will extended to the entire nation, so citizens could
properly regard the Constitution as a product of their own selfgovernment. Interestingly, as Kahn observes, the model of making continued to dominate during the post-ratification period
and, in particular, in the jurisprudence of Chief Justice John
Marshall. Thus, in cases such as Marbury v. Madison5 and
McCulloch v. Maryland,6 Marshall first defended his major constitutional conclusions as a matter of basic reason or scientific
deduction, and only then did he turn for additional support to the
actual language of the Constitution. By proceeding in this fashion, Marshall perpetuated the synthesis of reason and will, suggesting that the scientific truths of constitutional government
were linked to and legitimated by the positive text that the people had enacted.
As America moved toward the middle of the nineteenth
century and, relatedly, toward the Civil War, faith in the science
of politics declined. With the passage of time, moreover, no
longer could the Constitution be viewed as an act of contempo4. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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rary self-government. To cope with the problem of temporality,
constitutional theory progressed from the model of making to a
model of "organic maintenance." Under this model, the state
was understood as a living organism constituted by the people.
This organism had taken on life at the founding; now, it was to be
maintained and preserved. Citizens could embrace the Constitution as an act of their own self-government through an intertemporal identification with the Founders. Indeed, citizens were at
one with the Founders, part of the same organic unit, and the
Founders' Constitution became an object of almost sacred reverence. Reason and will no longer converged. Instead, the will of
the Founders was paramount. Constitutional interpretation
therefore was properly based not on science, but rather on history, and originalism became the central interpretive principle.
Under this model, there was broad agreement that the Founders' Constitution should be honored and conserved. At the
same time, however, there was radical disagreement concerning
the meaning of the Constitution and its bearing on the national
crisis that became the Civil War. "Everyone agreed that they
were the children of the founding fathers, but they did not agree
on the meaning of the familial obligation." Thus, thinkers as diverse as Joseph Story, John Calhoun, Roger Taney, Abraham
Lincoln, and Stephen Douglas, each in his own way, could embrace the maintenance model of constitutional government even
as they vigorously debated its implications.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 for example, Chief Justice Taney
relied on the Constitution's "true intent and meaning when it was
adopted"8 in ruling that Blacks could not become citizens of the
United States and that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional. For Taney, citizens' intertemporal identification with the
Founders depended on the maintenance of intergenerational
bloodlines, bloodlines that were racially distinct. Blacks, quite
simply, were not part of the American constitutional organism.
For Lincoln, by contrast, the inheritance from the Founders was
moral, not biological, and to identify with the Founders was to
identify with a vision of liberty and equality. Citizens' intertemporal link to the Founders took on a religious dimension, with
citizens transcending their individual finitude by becoming part
of the Founders' project, even to the point of "[giving] their lives

7. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
8. Id. at 405.
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that [the] nation might live,"9 this in penance for the corporate
sin of slavery.1o
The model of organic maintenance continued to dominate in
the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. The Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, was defended not as a constitutional
innovation, but rather as a return to the Founders' vision. At the
same time, however, the underpinnings of the maintenance
model were weakening. As each decade passed, it became more
and more difficult to justify an intertemporal identification with
the Founders, and the idea of progress suggested that the will of
the Founders might be little more than the dead hand of the past.
Reason returned to constitutional theory under a new model,
that of "growth" or "evolution." Unlike the abstract political science of the founding period, however, reason now was the product of rational experience, with the Constitution understood to
be evolving toward a comprehensively rational constitutional order. The nation remained a historically continuous political community, and history remained an important component in the
"science" of constitutional governance, but the founding lost its
special significance.
As with the earlier model of maintenance, agreement on the
model of evolution did not mean agreement on its substantive
implications. Likewise, it did not mean agreement on the proper
locus of constitutional growth. For some, the proper locus was
the courts; for others, the popular branches.
The model of constitutional evolution emerged first in theoretical writings and only later in the courts. Among the theoretical writings that Kahn discusses are the works of Sidney George
Fisher, Thomas Cooley, Christopher Tiedeman, Francis Wharton,
James Thayer, and Woodrow Wilson. In the courts, the model of
evolution developed gradually in the decades following the Civil
War, taking full form in the Supreme Court's 1905 decision in
Lochner v. New York."

The "progressive science" of the Lochner era12 was guided
by the experience of the common law, adapted to current conditions, and by the "common understandings" of the day,13 which
9. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, November 19, 1863, in Roy P. Basler, ed., Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and
Writings 734 (World Publishing Co., 1946).
10. See Abraham Lincoln, Second InauguralAddress, March 4, 1865, in Basler, ed.,
Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings at 792 (cited in note 9).
11. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 385 (1898).
13. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
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included a commitment to laissez faire. This notion of "scientific" governance by the judiciary, however, proved to be unstable. Legal realism provided a general critique of judicial
rationality. Even more telling was the rise of empirical science,
which questioned the reliability of the common law, displaced
"common understandings," and undermined the philosophy of
the free market as an ending point for constitutional government.
Given its changing character, the science of government was no
longer within the competence of the courts, but instead was better suited for legislative or administrative inquiry. The model of
evolution remained in place, along with its commitment to reason, as reflected in "the best science" of the day. Thus, according
to Kahn, the constitutional crisis of the 1930s did not involve a
conceptual revolution. But with the fall of Lochner, the locus of
"the best science," and therefore the locus of constitutional
evolution, had shifted from the courts to the popular branches.
In the wake of the 1930s, however, the lesson of Lochner
and its demise was reconceived. In hindsight, the constitutional
shift of the 1930s was viewed not as a product of changing science, but rather as a victory for majoritarian rule. In accordance
with this new understanding, the judicial protection of individual
rights now gave rise to the "countermajoritarian difficulty." Relatedly, the question for modern constitutional theory became a
new question of proper locus, this time the proper locus of will or
consent. The model of evolution had addressed the problem of
temporality by appealing to a sense of reason that would resonate in the present, permitting citizens to identify with the Constitution as a product of their own generation. But the evolution
model had focused on reason at the expense of will. It had suggested that the Constitution was to embody the will of the present, but it did not resolve the question of where that will should
properly reside. Should it rest in the autonomy of each individual citizen or in the political community as a whole, acting
through the popular branches? The debate between autonomy
and majoritarian rule thus became the central issue of modern
constitutional theory.
Like earlier debates, this one has included both academic
commentary and judicial decision making. Kahn discusses and
criticizes the writings of Learned Hand, Herbert Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, and John Ely, among others, and he also considers
a variety of modern decisions in which the Supreme Court has
embraced individual autonomy as a touchstone of constitutional
law. He examines not only the "privacy" decisions culminating
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in Roe v. Wade,14 but also a range of other cases that, according
to Kahn, can be understood to protect autonomy. In Kahn's
view, for example, the Court's equal protection doctrine rejects
historical categories in favor of individual self-definition through
the exercise of autonomy. In striking contrast to the citizen of
the nineteenth century's organic maintenance model, the autonomous citizen of the modem period is not part of an organic unit.
Rather, each citizen is a self-made individual who belongs to no
one else.
The judicial protection of autonomy remains controversial,
of course, and another strand of modem constitutional theory argues in favor of majoritarian rule. But the theories of autonomy
and majoritarian rule both promote the primacy of will over reason. Both reject, either explicitly or implicitly, the notion that
substantive values can be tested against the standards of reason.
Instead, such values are simply a matter of subjective preference,
whether that of the autonomous individual or that of the goveming majority.
The claims of the autonomous individual and of the governing majority have no logical stopping points, and they create
the dilemma that recently has given rise to the fourth model of
constitutional theory. Like the model of evolution, the model of
"community," at least in many of its variants, addresses the problem of temporality by linking the Constitution directly to the
present. More distinctively, this model attempts to resolve the
dilemma of will through a conceptual device that connects the
autonomous individual to the majority. This device is the community of discourse.
Unlike the previous three models, the model of community
is an academic product that has had little influence in the courts.
As a result, Kahn devotes his discussion to the academic literature, which consists of two related schools of thought: the new
republicanism of such writers as Bruce Ackerman, Frank
Michelman, and Cass Sunstein; and the "interpretivism" (broadly
defined) of such theorists as Owen Fiss, Robert Cover, and Ronald Dworkin. Although their theories differ in many respects,
these various republican and interpretive thinkers all embrace
the concept of a community of discourse. Accordingly, each theorist defines the particular sort of discursive community he has in
mind, including its institutional as well as its temporal location.

14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Despite their best efforts, these community theorists cannot
resolve the dilemma of will. Discourse can involve the exercise
of "positive freedom," a process by which the individual and the
community engage in a mutual creation of meaning. Through
this process, individual autonomy merges with the community's
definition of value, and the dilemma of will disappears. The
model of community thus can create an identity between individuals and the constitutional order of which they are a part. As
Kahn explains, however, no community of discourse includes all
(or even most) citizens, and those who are excluded are not engaged in the exercise of positive freedom. To the contrary, for
these (most) citizens, the coercion of the constitutional order
works to frustrate their freedom, in the sense of individual autonomy, and the dilemma of will remains unresolved. Even if the
judiciary, the legislature, or some other interpretive institution
can be viewed as "a self-generative, dialogic community, [this]
has nothing to do with the authority the institution exercises over
the rest of the political community." Kahn thus agrees with Robert Cover that the constitutional order is less the product of a
community of discourse than an attempt to silence the many
competing voices in our society.
Kahn believes that the sequential development of the four
models of constitutional theory has been a matter of logical progression. Under the making model, there was a synthesis of reason and will. With the passage of time, however, new theories
were required to justify the constitutional order for generations
farther and farther removed from the founding. The synthesis of
reason and will disappeared. Under the model of maintenance,
constitutional theory emphasized will to the exclusion of reason.
Later, the model of evolution reversed this preference, de-emphasizing will and focusing instead on the importance of reason.
The model of community attempts to regain the synthesis,
bringing constitutional theory full circle. Under the community
model, citizens are to create their own sense of meaning-their
own sense of reason-through an act of will, the act of communitarian discourse. For Kahn, this model represents "the end of
constitutional theory." But, as Kahn explains, this final model of
constitutional theory cannot resolve the dilemma of will and
therefore cannot justify the constitutional order. Indeed, because the model of discursive community is inconsistent with
every assertion of authority outside the discourse, Kahn argues
that it is ultimately subversive of the constitutional order. More
generally, Kahn concludes that the problem of constitutional the-
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ory simply cannot be resolved: "Under the conditions of temporality within which any state exists, self-government is not
possible."
Nowhere have I encountered a more engaging book about
constitutional theory. Kahn brings a wealth of historical resources to bear, and he offers a probing analytical critique of the
materials that he confronts. His description of recent works of
constitutional theory is lucid, sometimes more so than the originals. He cuts to the heart of each theoretical effort and deftly
exposes its primary weaknesses. Likewise, Kahn makes a
number of insightful observations concerning the judicial decisions that he discusses. What is more, he ties his book together
with an original and provocative explanation of the historical
progression of constitutional thought.
This book is not without shortcomings. Although Kahn discusses earlier judicial decisions, often at length, he has very little
to say about recent trends in the Supreme Court. As Kahn notes,
the Court has been largely unaffected by the work of contemporary academics, but surely the Court's decisions in the 1980s and
1990s have their own implications for the path of constitutional
theory.
Further, Kahn's argument of logical progression is subject to
challenge. Kahn makes a convincing case for the development of
each of the models that he discusses, but as he concedes, the
older models have never been purged from constitutional theory.
Instead, they remain available as sources of justification for constitutional decision makers such as the Supreme Court. Kahn
gives some attention to the continuing influence of these older
models, but he might have done more in this respect. Even today, for example, the maintenance model exerts a considerable
pull, perhaps in part for reasons that can be traced to the making
model. In particular, we may respect the will of the Founders not
simply for its own sake, but rather because we actually trust the
Founders' wisdom, the sense of reason or political "science" that
their will reflects. Likewise, the model of growth remains a powerful force in contemporary constitutional theory. Not everyone,
and certainly not the Supreme Court, has fallen prey to "the
communitarian virus sweeping constitutional theory." Outside
the academy, at least, it seems that the dominant models of constitutional theory continue to be those of organic maintenance
and growth, not communitarian discourse.
Kahn is right in suggesting that the predicament of contemporary constitutional theory is tied to the contest between autonomy and majoritarian rule, and that this contest in turn is linked
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to the increasingly prevalent belief that normative moral judgments are matters simply of personal preference. The problem
of moral skepticism, however, runs deep and wide in American
culture; it is hardly unique to constitutional theory. For us to
move beyond the impasse of contemporary constitutional theory,
we must confront the moral predicament of American society in
general. We must address the existence and meaning of moral
truth in the radically pluralistic, and increasingly polarized, society in which we live. A daunting challenge, to say the least.

THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE. By Howard Gillman.1 Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 317. $29.95.
Herbert Hovenkamp2
Gillman's book is another in a long and growing list of titles
written in the 1980s and early 1990s designed to illuminate the
Lochner era in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Gillman is interested mainly in antecedents, beginning with the Founders and focusing heavily on the Jackson period. Like most good recent
writing on this subject, Gillman eschews the use of legal "formalism" as an explanatory paradigm. That notion, that the judges
were rule-bound lawyers who separated law from policy, explains
little and is, in any event, wrong. Substantive due process was
driven by policy concerns just as much as landmark twentiethcentury decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education or Roe v.
Wade, and the judges who espoused it were a highly creative and
energetic group.
Gillman argues that although substantive due process was
formalized in American constitutional thought in the 1880s and
after, its presence is detectable much earlier than historians have
generally realized. Indeed, one can find it as early as the late
eighteenth century, and it becomes quite visible already in the
second decade of the nineteenth century. As he notes, the great
revolution in ideas of free trade that facilitated the rise of the
Jacksonian movement and an incipient national market created a
corresponding hostility toward parochial state and local regulations that tended to favor hometown businesses at the expense of
1. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California.
2. Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.

